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Abstract. In the celebrated “Secretary Problem,” involving n candi-
dates who have applied for a single vacant secretarial position, the em-
ployer interviews them one by one in random order, and learns their
relative ranks. As soon as each interview is over, the employer must
either hire the candidate (and stop the process) or reject her (never
to be recalled). We consider a variation of this problem where the em-
ployer also learns the scores of the already interviewed candidates, which
are assumed to be independent and drawn from a known continuous
probability distribution. With this additional information, what strat-
egy should the employer follow in order to maximize his chance of hiring
the candidate with the highest score among all n candidates? What is
the maximum probability of hiring the best candidate?
Keywords: Analytical expression, Conditional probability, Iterative com-
putation, Recursive relation, Simulation
1 Background and Statement of the Problem
Recall the celebrated Secretary Problem: There are n applicants who have ap-
plied for the single open position of a secretary. The employer will interview
them one by one in random order. At the conclusion of each interview, the em-
ployer must decide either to hire the candidate (and stop interviewing) or to let
her go for good never to be recalled. At any time the employer has a relative
ranking of all candidates interviewed so far, but he does not have their absolute
ranking among all n candidates (unless and until he interviews all candidates).
His objective is to hire the best candidate. Obviously, he must consider hiring a
candidate only if she is the best among all interviewed candidates. How can he
maximize his probability of hiring the best candidate among all n candidates?
If the employer hires a candidate after interviewing too few candidates, he
runs the risk of missing the best candidate who is yet to be interviewed. On the
other hand, if he waits too long to hire, he will have too few candidates left to be
interviewed, and hence a small chance that one of them will surpass the leading
candidate among those who have been already interviewed (and this leading
candidate has not been hired). Assuming that all permutations of candidates
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by rank are equally likely, the optimal strategy turns out to be: “Interview
and let go the first m − 1 candidates, and thereafter hire the first candidate
among m,m + 1, . . . , n − 1 who is the best among all interviewed candidates,
if such a candidate comes along; otherwise, hire the last candidate.” The value
m, of course, depends on n. In fact, m = argmaxk{pn(k)} where pn(1) = 1/n
and for k ≥ 2, pn(k) = k−1n
∑n
j=k
1
j−1 . The maximum probability of hiring
the best candidate by following the optimal strategy is pn(m). In particular,
asymptotically (as n → ∞), the optimal choice is m ≈ n/e, and the associated
highest probability of hiring the best candidate is 1/e = 0.3678794 · · ·.
The secretary problem is also known as the marriage problem, the sultan’s
dowry problem, the fussy suitor problem, the game of googol and the best choice
problem. It was apparently introduced in 1949 by Merrill M. Flood [4], who
mentions that R. Palermo proved that all strategies are dominated by a strategy
of the form: “Reject the first k−1 unconditionally, then accept the next candidate
who is the best.” The first publication was apparently by Martin Gardner in
The Scientific American, February 1960, where he presented the analysis by Leo
Moser and J.R. Pounder. It was reprinted with additional comments in [5]. The
1/e-law of best choice is due to F. Thomas Bruss [2]. We refer the reader to
Ferguson [3] for an extensive bibliography.
Here we consider a variation of the Secretary Problem, in which we know
the probability distribution from which the scores of each candidate is drawn.
Suppose that the candidates appear in a random order. After interviewing each
candidate, the employer not only knows her relative rank among all candidates
interviewed so far, but also he knows her absolute score, which is assumed to
be drawn from a known distribution. In this modified situation, what strategy
should the employer follow in order to maximize his chance of hiring the candi-
date with the highest score among all n candidates? More precisely, we consider
the problem below.
Score-Based Secretary Problem: In the context of the Secretary
Problem, suppose that the employer, after interviewing the candidates,
can assign absolute scores X1, X2, . . ., which are assumed to be drawn
independently from the same known continuous distribution function F .
What is the employer’s best strategy to maximize the chance of win-
ning (that is, hiring the candidate with the highest score among all n
candidates)? What is the maximum probability of winning?
In preparation for solving the score-based secretary problem, let us make a
few straight-forward observations:
1) Without loss of generality, we can assume that the scores are independent
and identically distributed (IID) as uniform (0, 1). For otherwise, we will
simply replace each score X by U = F (X), which will have uniform (0, 1)
distribution. See Exercise 1.2 of [7]. Also, by the continuity of F , ties among
scores is ruled out (for when the scores are displayed to infinitely-many
decimal places, surely they will differ).
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2) The employer will surely let go any candidate who scores below someone else
already interviewed. He should consider hiring a candidate only if her score
is a record high value in the sense that it is the largest among all scores
assigned so far. Clearly, X1 is a record high score. Thereafter, for m > 1,
Xm is a record high value if Xm = max{X1, X2, . . . , Xm}; or equivalently, if
and only if Xm > Xi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1.
3) The employer should consider hiring a candidate with a record high score
provided her score is large enough so that there is only a small chance that
some other candidate yet to be interviewed will score higher than the current
candidate. How large a score is large enough for the employer to win the game
(or hire a candidate with record high score)?
4) The requisite threshold, above which the employer should hire a candidate
with a record high score, depends on how many candidates are yet to be
interviewed. Finding the threshold corresponding to each possible remaining
number of candidates to be interviewed is the crux of the solution to the
problem. We contend that the thresholds can be found inductively as we
allow more and more candidates.
Let us describe the employer’s best strategy and his overall chance of winning.
Definition 1 If there are n applicants, let θn denote the threshold such that
the employer maximizes his probability of hiring the best candidate by using the
strategy “Hire Candidate 1, who scores X1, if and only if X1 > θn.”
Form of the Best Strategy: “IfX1 > θn, then hire Candidate 1. Otherwise,
wait until a candidate receives a record high score Xm. If Xm > θn+1−m, then
hire Candidate m. Otherwise, let her go and wait until the next record high
score is attained. Etc.”
Definition 2 If there are n applicants, let ωn denote the (maximal) proba-
bility that the employer wins the game (that is, hires the best candidate) if he
uses his above-stated best strategy.
We will now inductively determine θn and ωn for all n = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
2 Exact Solutions for Small Number of Candidates
Recall that the potential scores of the candidates (in the order interviewed) are
X1, X2, . . . , Xn, which we assume are IID uniform (0,1). If there is only n = 1
applicant, the solution is trivial: Hire her irrespective of her score; that is, θ1 = 0.
In this case the employer surely hires the best candidate by default. So, ω1 = 1.
Let us proceed to determine (θ2, ω2), (θ3, ω3), . . ..
Suppose that n = 2. In this case, after interviewing Candidate 1 who has
received score X1, there is only one more candidate to be interviewed. If x1 >
1/2, then the employer should hire Candidate 1, because, given x1 > 1/2, the
conditional probability that the employer wins (or hires the better candidate)
is P{X2 < x1} = x1 > 1/2. On the other hand, if x1 < 1/2, then the employer
should let Candidate 1 go, and hire Candidate 2, because, given x1 < 1/2, the
conditional probability that the employer wins is P{X2 > x1} = 1 − x1 > 1/2.
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Fig. 1 shows the function f2(x1) = max{1− x1, x1}, the conditional probability
of the employer winning, given X1 = x1.
Fig. 1. Conditional probability f2(x1) that the employer wins, given X1 = x1
Since X1 follows a uniform (0, 1) distribution, the overall probability that
the employer wins is the area under the graph of f2(x1); that is,
ω2 =
∫ 1
0
f2(x1) dx1 =
∫ 1/2
0
(1− x1) dx1 +
∫ 1
1/2
x1 dx1 =
3
4
. (1)
We claim that θ2 = 1/2. The justification is as follows: If the employer adopts
a strategy of hiring Candidate 1 if and only if x1 > θ, with any other threshold
value θ, then his overall probability of winning will be, as seen from Fig. 2,∫ θ
0
(1− x1) dx1 +
∫ 1
θ
x1 dx1 = θ(1− θ) + 1/2 = 3
4
−
(
θ − 1
2
)2
∈
(
1
2
,
3
4
)
.(2)
Hence, any threshold value θ other than θ2 = 1/2 actually lowers the employer’s
overall probability of winning. Interestingly though, by choosing any sub-optimal
threshold θ2 6= 1/2, even by choosing θ = 0 (that is, always hire Candidate 1
irrespective of her score) or θ = 1 (that is, never hire Candidate 1), the employer’s
overall chance of winning never falls below 1/2.
Next, suppose that n = 3. In this case, after interviewing Candidate 1, who
scored X1 = x1, there are two more candidates to interview. We must determine
the value of θ3 such that the employer’s best strategy is to hire Candidate 1 with
score X1 = x1 if and only if x1 > θ3. Let us analyze separately what happens if
(A) Candidate 1 is hired, and (B) Candidate 1 is let go:
(A) If Candidate 1 is hired, then the interviewer has not seen scores X2 and
X3, which are independent uniform (0, 1) variables. In this case, the employer’s
conditional probability of winning is
P hire3 (x1) = Pr{X2 < x1, X3 < x1} = Pr{X2 < x1} · Pr{X3 < x1} = x21 . (3)
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Fig. 2. For n = 2, the employer’s probability of hiring the better candidate if he uses a
suboptimal strategy by choosing thresholds θ and 0 for Candidates 1 and 2 respectively
Note that P hire3 (x1) is an increasing function of x1 on (0, 1) going from 0 to 1.
Thus, whenever it is advantageous for the employer to hire Candidate 1 with a
particular score x1, it must be also advantageous for him to hire Candidate 1
with any score bigger than x1.
(B) On the other hand, if the employer lets go Candidate 1 with a score x1,
he gets to interview Candidate 2 and obtain X2. The problem almost reduces to
the case of only two candidates, except that the employer should not apply his
best strategy for the two-candidate game unless X2 is a record high value; that
is, unless X2 > x1. There are three mutually exclusive cases to consider: (1) If
X2 < x1, then the employer should let Candidate 2 go, he should continue to
interview Candidate 3 to obtain X3, and win only if X3 > x1. (2) If X2 > x1 but
X2 < θ2, then (in accordance with the optimal strategy for the two-candidate
game) the employer should still let Candidate 2 go, interview Candidate 3 to
obtain X3, and win only if X3 > X2. (3) If X2 > x1 and X2 > θ2, then the
employer should hire Candidate 2, and win if X3 < X2.
So, given x1 and the contemplated choice that the employer should let go (or
skip over) Candidate 1, the conditional probability of his winning is
P skip3 (x1) = Pr({X2 < x1, X3 > x1} ∪ {X2 > x1, X2 < θ2, X3 > X2} ∪
{X2 > x1, X2 > θ2, X3 < X2})
= x1(1− x1) +
∫ 1
x1
f2(x) dx =
{
3
4 − x
2
1
2 if x1 ≤ 1/2
(1− x1)
(
x1 +
1+x1
2
)
if x1 ≥ 1/2
.
Fig. 3a-b show P skip3 (x1) as the total area of the enclosed region for two
typical values of x1—(a) below 1/2 and (b) above 1/2.
It can be checked that P skip3 (x1) is a decreasing function of x1 on (0, 1) going
from ω2 = 3/4 to 0, while P
hire
3 (x1) is an increasing function of x1 on (0, 1) going
from 0 to 1. By the intermediate value theorem (see [1], for example) these two
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Fig. 3. For (a) x1 < .5 and (b) x1 > .5, the conditional probability that the employer
wins if he lets go Candidate 1, obtains X2 = x2, and follows his best strategy.
functions intersect in (0, 1) at a unique point x1 = θ3 = (1 +
√
6)/5, which is
obtained by solving (1−x1) · (1+3x1)/2 = x21, or equivalently 5x21−2x1−1 = 0.
Therefore, the employer should hire Candidate 1 if and only if x1 > θ3. Hence,
given x1, the conditional probability of the employer winning (if he follows the
optimal strategy) is f3(x1) = max{P skip3 (x1), P hire3 (x1)}, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Conditional probability f3(x1) that the employer wins the three-candidate
game, given Candidate 1’s score x1, if the employer follows his optimal strategy
Finally, if the employer uses this optimal strategy for n = 3, his overall
probability of winning is
ω3 =
∫ 1
0
f3(x) dx
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=
∫ 1/2
0
(
3
4
− x
2
1
2
)
dx1 +
∫ θ3
1/2
(1− x1)
(
1 + 3x1
2
)
dx1 +
∫ 1
θ3
x21 dx1
=
17
48
+
x1 + x
2
1 − x31
2
|θ31/2 +
x31
3
|1θ3 =
293 + 48
√
6
600
= 0.68429251 .
For n ≥ 4 candidates, we proceed inductively. Suppose that the solutions for
the n-candidate game—P hiren (x1), P
skip
n (x1), fn(x1), θn, ωn—are already found.
Then we find the solutions for the (n+ 1)-candidate game using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
Step 1 Define P hiren+1(x1) = x1 · P hiren (x1) = xn1 , which is an increasing function
of x1 on (0, 1) going from 0 to 1.
Step 2 Define P skipn+1(x1) = x1 ·P skipn (x1)+
∫ 1
x1
fn(x1) dx1, which is a decreasing
function on (0, 1) going from ωn to 0.
Step 3 The unique solution to P skipn+1(x1) = P
hire
n+1(x1) in x1 yields θn+1.
Step 4 Define fn+1(x1) = max{P skipn+1(x1), P hiren+1(x1)}, and obtain the winning
probability ωn+1 =
∫ 1
0
fn+1(x1) dxn+1.
Using Algorithm 1, we can obtain θ4 = .775845, by solving 17x
3
1 − 6x21 −
3x1 − 2 = 0; and we can evaluate ω4 =
∫ 1
0
f4(x1) dx1 = .655397. In this man-
ner, we can continue to use Algorithm 1 to find (θ5, ω5), (θ6, ω6), . . .. But the
Calculus becomes tedious! In Section 3 we describe a computational technique
to evaluate (θn, ωn) recursively, and we verify the optimality of the solutions
through simulation. In Section 4 we develop analytical expressions of (θn, ωn)
for all n ≥ 3.
3 Computing (θn, ωn) and Verifying by Simulation
Now-a-days the ability to compute is at everyone’s fingertip—thanks to the
invention of personal computer and the advancement of computer languages.
For instance, using the programming language (and statistical software) R, which
anyone can download for free on to their computer, one can evaluate (θn, ωn).
3.1 Computational Evaluation of (θn, ωn)
First, the integrals in Steps 2 and 4 of Algorithm 1 can be approximated by
computing the Riemann sum. To do so, we recommend partitioning the interval
(0, 1) into 106 equal sub-intervals of width 10−6 each and evaluate the integrand
at the middle point of each sub-interval. Then the integral is approximated by
the mean of the functional values at the 106 midpoints. See [1], for example.
Second, because P skipn+1(x1) is decreasing from ωn to 0, while P
hire
n+1(x1) is
increasing from 0 to 1 in the interval (0, 1), the n-degree polynomial equation in
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Step 3 of Algorithm 1 can be solved (approximately) by computing the largest
argument at which P skipn+1(x1) > P
hire
n+1(x1), plus half of 10
−6. The R codes for
inductively computing (θn+1, ωn+1) are given below.
R Codes to Compute (θn+1, ωn+1) Inductively
B=10^6; H=0.5/B
serial=seq(1:B);grid=serial/B-H
theta=c(0); win=c(1) # for n=1
# for n=2 define directly
hire=grid;skip=1-grid;
theta=c(theta, grid[max(which(skip>hire))]+H)
fun=pmax(skip, hire); win=c(win, mean(fun))
# for n>2 define recursively
for (i in 3:100){
hire=hire*grid # Step 1
skip=(cumsum(fun[B:1])[B:1]+(serial-1)*skip)/B # Step 2
theta=c(theta, grid[max(which(skip>hire))]+H) # Step 3
fun=pmax(skip, hire); win=c(win, mean(fun)) # Step 4
}
Table 1 gives (θn, ωn) for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 100 correct to six decimal places. Fig.
5a-d depict the conditional probability fn(x1) that the employer wins given x1,
if he follows his optimal strategy for n = 5, 10, 20, 100 candidates. (θn+1, ωn+1)
Table 1. The thresholds of the employer’s optimal strategy and his maximal
probability of winning corresponding to 1-100 candidates.
>round(theta, 6)
[1] 0.000000 0.500000 0.689898 0.775845 0.824590 0.855949 0.877807 0.893910 0.906265 0.916044
[11] 0.923976 0.930539 0.936059 0.940767 0.944829 0.948370 0.951484 0.954243 0.956706 0.958917
[21] 0.960913 0.962724 0.964375 0.965886 0.967274 0.968553 0.969736 0.970834 0.971854 0.972806
[31] 0.973695 0.974528 0.975310 0.976045 0.976738 0.977392 0.978010 0.978595 0.979150 0.979677
[41] 0.980178 0.980654 0.981109 0.981542 0.981956 0.982352 0.982731 0.983094 0.983442 0.983776
[51] 0.984097 0.984405 0.984702 0.984987 0.985262 0.985527 0.985783 0.986030 0.986269 0.986499
[61] 0.986722 0.986938 0.987146 0.987349 0.987544 0.987734 0.987919 0.988097 0.988271 0.988440
[71] 0.988603 0.988763 0.988917 0.989068 0.989215 0.989357 0.989496 0.989632 0.989764 0.989892
[81] 0.990018 0.990140 0.990260 0.990376 0.990490 0.990601 0.990710 0.990816 0.990919 0.991021
[91] 0.991120 0.991217 0.991312 0.991405 0.991495 0.991584 0.991672 0.991757 0.991841 0.991922
>round(win, 6)
[1] 1.000000 0.750000 0.684293 0.655396 0.639194 0.628784 0.621508 0.616128 0.611986 0.608700
[11] 0.606028 0.603813 0.601948 0.600356 0.598981 0.597781 0.596725 0.595788 0.594952 0.594201
[21] 0.593522 0.592906 0.592344 0.591830 0.591358 0.590922 0.590519 0.590145 0.589797 0.589472
[31] 0.589169 0.588885 0.588618 0.588367 0.588131 0.587908 0.587697 0.587497 0.587307 0.587127
[41] 0.586956 0.586793 0.586638 0.586490 0.586348 0.586213 0.586084 0.585960 0.585841 0.585726
[51] 0.585617 0.585511 0.585410 0.585312 0.585218 0.585127 0.585040 0.584955 0.584874 0.584795
[61] 0.584719 0.584645 0.584573 0.584504 0.584437 0.584372 0.584309 0.584248 0.584189 0.584131
[71] 0.584075 0.584020 0.583967 0.583916 0.583865 0.583817 0.583769 0.583723 0.583678 0.583633
[81] 0.583591 0.583549 0.583508 0.583468 0.583429 0.583391 0.583354 0.583317 0.583282 0.583247
[91] 0.583213 0.583180 0.583147 0.583116 0.583085 0.583054 0.583024 0.582995 0.582966 0.582938
As seen in Table 1, for the game involving 10 candidates, the employer’s
overall probability of winning, if he follows his optimal strategy, is about 61%.
Likewise, for the game involving 100 candidates, the employer’s overall probabil-
ity of winning, if he follows his optimal strategy, is about 58%. However, we also
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Fig. 5. Conditional probability fn(x1) that the employer wins, given the score x1 of
Candidate 1, if he follows his optimal strategy for (a) 5, (b) 10, (c) 20, (d) 100 candidates
note that his probability of winning is monotonically decreasing as the number
of candidates is increasing. Will the game continue to be favorable to him as the
number of candidate increase, say to 500 or to 1000? Will there be a limiting
value to the employer’s probability of winning as the number of candidates in-
crease without bound? Based on the fact that the thresholds and the winning
probabilities for 951-1000 candidates have stabilized, as seen from Table 2, we
conjecture that the answers are affirmative; but we leave the details to the reader
to investigate.
Table 2. The thresholds of the employer’s optimal strategy and his maximal
probability of winning corresponding to 951-1000 candidates.
>round(theta[951:1000], 6)
[951] 0.999154 0.999155 0.999156 0.999157 0.999158 0.999158 0.999159 0.999160 0.999161 0.999162
[961] 0.999163 0.999164 0.999165 0.999165 0.999166 0.999167 0.999168 0.999169 0.999170 0.999171
[971] 0.999171 0.999172 0.999173 0.999174 0.999175 0.999176 0.999177 0.999177 0.999178 0.999179
[981] 0.999180 0.999181 0.999182 0.999182 0.999183 0.999184 0.999185 0.999186 0.999187 0.999187
[991] 0.999188 0.999189 0.999190 0.999191 0.999191 0.999192 0.999193 0.999194 0.999195 0.999195
> round(win[951:1000], 6)
[951] 0.580477 0.580477 0.580477 0.580476 0.580476 0.580476 0.580475 0.580475 0.580475 0.580475
[961] 0.580474 0.580474 0.580474 0.580473 0.580473 0.580473 0.580473 0.580472 0.580472 0.580472
[971] 0.580472 0.580471 0.580471 0.580471 0.580470 0.580470 0.580470 0.580470 0.580469 0.580469
[981] 0.580469 0.580469 0.580468 0.580468 0.580468 0.580468 0.580467 0.580467 0.580467 0.580467
[991] 0.580466 0.580466 0.580466 0.580466 0.580465 0.580465 0.580465 0.580464 0.580464 0.580464
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3.2 Verifying Optimality of Computed Values via Simulation
In solving the Score-based Secretary Problem, we made claims of a probabilistic
nature. For example, when n = 5, we claimed: “The employer’s maximal prob-
ability of winning a five-candidate game is ω5 = .639194, and he can achieve
this probability by adhering to an optimal strategy with θ1 = 0, θ2 = .5, θ3 =
.689898, θ4 = .775845, θ5 = .824590.” The correctness of this claim can be veri-
fied by conducting a simulation, which involves imitating a random phenomenon
by generating an appropriate sequence of random numbers.
One can simulate the 5-candidate game a large number of times to esti-
mate the employer’s probability of winning using the R codes below. The win5
function, used in the codes, indicates whether the employer wins in any one
particular play. The estimated probability of the employer’s winning, pˆ, is given
by the mean of the indicators of win in a series of M = 106 plays. In fact, in
view of the central limit theorem, there is about 95% chance that the estimate
pˆ will be within 1.96
√
p(1− p)/M < 1/√M of the true probability p. See [2],
for example. Therefore, our estimate pˆ based on M = 106 repetitions, will be
correct to three decimal places with about 95% probability.
When the above-described simulation is run with the optimal choice of the
threshold values, the estimate of the employer’s probability of winning is found to
be .638607, whereas when run with one particular alternative choice of thresholds
the estimate turns out to be .636515, and with another alternative choice it turns
out to be .592601. Since the estimates are correct to three decimal places, as
reasoned above, this simulation provides sufficient justification for the optimal
choice of thresholds, and declares the other choices of thresholds as suboptimal.
We encourage the readers to estimate the probability that the employer wins
when other choices of the threshold values θ3, θ4, θ5 are made; and verify that
none will do better than the optimal choices of thresholds our Algorithm 1
has produced. In Section 4 we will compute the employer’s exact probability of
winning, for each of these strategies.
R Codes to Simulate Winning Probability for any Set of Thresholds
win5 <- function(theta3,theta4,theta5){
coin=runif(5, 0, 1); top=max(coin)
if (coin[1]>=theta5){ind=(coin[1]==top)}
else{if (coin[2]>=max(coin[1],theta4)){ind=(coin[2]==top)}
else{if (coin[3]>=max(coin[1:2],theta3)){ind=(coin[3]==top)}
else{if (coin[4]>=max(coin[1:3],1/2)){ind=(coin[4]==top)}
else{ind=(coin[5]==top)}
} } }
ind
}
mean(replicate(10^6, win5((1+sqrt(6))/5,.775845,.824590))) #opt
mean(replicate(10^6, win5(2/3, 3/4, 4/5))) # alternative 1
mean(replicate(10^6, win5(1/2,.5^(1/5),.5^(1/5),.5^(1/5)))) #2
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4 Analytical Expressions of (θn, ωn)
A careful study of Algorithm 1 leads to an analytical expression for θn, given in
Theorem 1, and thereafter an analytical expression of ωn, given in Theorem 2.
Towards these results, we note the following:
(a) From Step 1, we have P hiren+1(x) = x
n for all x ∈ (0, 1).
(b) From Step 4, we have fn(x) = max{P skipn (x), P hiren (x)} for all x ∈ (0, 1). In
particular, fn(x) = P
hire
n (x) for all x ∈ (θn, 1).
(c) From Steps 2 and 1 and item (b) above, for all x ∈ (θn, 1), we have
P skipn+1(x) = xP
skip
n (x) +
∫ 1
x
P hiren (u) du = xP
skip
n (x) +
1− xn
n
(4)
In fact, solving (4), we get Lemma 1 (to be proved momentarily):
Lemma 1. For all n ≥ 1, we have
P skipn+1(x) =
[
n∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
]
xn . (5)
(d) From Step 3, we have θn+1 is the unique solution to P
skip
n+1(x) = P
skip
n+1(x);
or equivalently, in view of items (a) and (c) above, θn+1 is the solution to
n∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
= 1 . (6)
In other words, we obtain Theorem 1 (to be proved shortly):
Theorem 1. θn+1 = (1 + n+1)
−1, where n+1 is the unique solution to
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
i
i
= 1 . (7)
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is by mathematical induction on n. We
know that P skip1 (x) = 0 and P
hire
1 (x) = 1 for all x ∈ (0, 1). Next, we know that
P skip2 (x) = 1− x for all x ∈ (0, 1). Also, putting n = 1 in (4), for x ∈ (0, 1), we
have
P skip2 (x) = xP
skip
1 (x) +
∫ 1
x
u0 du = x · 0 + (1− x) = (x−1 − 1)x
Hence, (5) holds for n = 1.
Now suppose that (5) holds for an arbitrary n ≥ 1. Then from (4), we have
P skipn+1(x) = x ·
[
n−1∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
]
xn−1 +
1− xn
n
=
[
n−1∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
]
xn +
1− xn
n
=
[
n∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
]
xn .
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Hence, (5) holds for n+ 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1. Write x = (1+)−1. Then starting from (6), applying
the binomial theorem, and simplifying, we have
1 =
n∑
k=1
x−k − 1
k
=
n∑
k=1
(1 + )k − 1
k
=
n∑
k=1
1
k
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
i =
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=i
1
i
(
k − 1
i− 1
)
i
=
n∑
i=1
{
n∑
k=i
(
k − 1
i− 1
)}
i
i
=
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
i
i
.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
We already know that θ1 = 0, θ2 = 1/2. Putting n = 2 into Theorem 1,
we solve 2 + 2/2 = 1 to obtain 3 = −2 +
√
6; whence θ3 = (1 + 3)
−1 =
(−1 + √6)−1 = (1 + √6)/5. Next, putting n = 3 into Theorem 1, we solve
3 + 32/2 + 3/3 = 1 to obtain 4 = 0.288917; and hence θ4 = 1/1.288917 =
.775845. The advantage of using Theorem 1, over the computational technique
of Algorithm 1 in Section 3, is that we can now compute θn directly without
having to compute first θ3, θ4, . . . , θn−1.
Remark 1 Since the left hand side expression in (7) is increasing in n at each
fixed  ∈ (0, 1), the solution {n+1} is a decreasing sequence. Hence, {θn} is an
increasing sequence.
Remark 2 For n ≥ 100, we can approximate θn as 0.447651/n, or more simply
approximate it as 1− 0.8035/n.
The optimal thresholds θ1 = 0, θ2 = 1/2, θ3 = (1 +
√
6)/5, θ4, . . . , θn are used
to find an analytical expression for ωn as given in Theorem 2 below. In fact, this
theorem holds for any non-decreasing sequence of thresholds ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn, which
need not be the optimal thresholds. The proof is delegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 2. For any non-decreasing sequence of thresholds {ξn} with ξn ∈
(0, 1), used by the employer to hire a candidate whose score is a running maxi-
mum and exceeds the corresponding threshold, the probability that the employer
wins is given by
Pn(Win; {ξn})
=
1
n
+
[
ξn−12
(n− 1) · 1 −
H¯1 ξ
n
2
n
]
+
[
ξn−23
(n− 2) · 2 +
ξn−13
(n− 1) · 1 −
H¯2 ξ
n
3
n
]
+ . . .+
[
ξn
1 · (n− 1) +
ξ2n
2 · (n− 2) + . . .+
ξn−1n
(n− 1) · 1 −
H¯n−1 ξnn
n
]
.
where H¯n = 1 +Hn and Hn = 1 + 1/2 + . . .+ 1/n is the n-th harmonic number.
Score-Based Secretary Problem 13
Using Theorem 2 we can find the employer’s probability of winning if he
uses any set of non-decreasing thresholds. In particular, in the simulation study
of Section 3, for n = 5, we simply estimated P{Win} based on 106 plays of
the game for the optimal strategy as well as for two alternative strategies. We
can now compute the exact value of P{Win} for each strategy: It is .6391947
for optimal strategy, .6370689 for alternative 1, and .5923543 for alternative 2.
Thus, we exhibit that indeed the alternative strategies are sub-optimal,
5 Conclusion
We reiterate that there is no need to restrict the candidates scores to have the
uniform (0, 1) distribution. The results of this paper will continue to hold if the
scores are drawn from any known continuous distribution function F with only
one small change: Simply replace the thresholds of the employer’s optimal strat-
egy by the corresponding percentiles of F . The employer’s maximal probability
of winning will remain unaltered.
Also we can solve the problem of hiring the candidate with the minimum
score (say, on some undesirable negative trait) among all n candidates by sim-
ply defining Y = 1 − X and hiring the candidate with the maximum Y -score.
Likewise, we can solve the problem of hiring the candidate with a score closest
to any specific percentile of F .
Whereas in the usual Secretary Problem (with only relative ranks available)
the limiting (as n → ∞) winning probability is 1/e = .368, in our score-based
secretary problem, we conjecture that the limiting winning probability is about
.580. The details are left to the reader.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that the employer hires Candidate k, where
k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Recall that the employer hires Candidate 1 iff X1 > ξ1. Other-
wise, he hires Candidate k ≥ 2 provided he has not already hired anyone earlier
and Xk = s exceeds both the previous maximum r = max{X1, . . . , Xk−1} and
the threshold value ξn+1−k for Candidate k. In order to express the probability
density function of r, subject to the fact that no candidate among Candidates
1, 2, . . . , k − 1 has been hired, we must account for which candidate possibly
achieved the record score r among Candidates 1, 2, . . . , k−1. Therefore, we split
the range (0, ξn) of r into sub-intervals
(ξn−1, ξn), (ξn−2, ξn−1), . . . , (ξn+1−k, ξn+2−k), (0, ξn+1−k) ;
and note that the number of possible candidates who might have achieved r is
respectively 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, k − 1 in these intervals. See Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. If Candidate k ≥ 2 with score Xk = s is hired, then what is the likely score
r = max{X1, . . . , Xk−1} of the previous leading candidate, and which candidate is she?
Having hired Candidate k, the employer wins (or hires the best candidate)
only if all future Candidates also score below Candidate k. Adding up the joint
probability that the employer hires Candidate k and he wins, we obtain
Pn(Win) =
n∑
k=1
Pn(Hire k and Win)
=
∫ 1
ξn
sn−1 ds+
n−1∑
k=2

k−1∑
j=1
∫ ξn+1−j
ξn−j
j rk−2
∫ 1
r
sn−k ds dr
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+
∫ ξn+1−k
0
(k − 1) rk−2
∫ 1
ξn+1−k
sn−k ds dr
}
+
n−1∑
j=1
∫ ξn+1−j
ξn−j
j rn−2
∫ 1
r
s0 ds dr
=
1− ξnn
n
+
n−1∑
k=2

k−1∑
j=1
∫ ξn+1−j
ξn−j
j
rk−2 − rn−1
n+ 1− k dr
+
∫ ξn+1−k
0
(k − 1) rk−2 1− ξ
n+1−k
n+1−k
n+ 1− k dr
}
+
n−1∑
j=1
∫ ξn+1−j
ξn−j
j (rn−2 − rn−1) dr
=
1− ξnn
n
+
n∑
k=2
1
n+ 1− k {
k−1∑
j=1
j
(
ξk−1n−j − ξk−1n+1−j
k − 1 −
ξnn−j − ξnn+1−j
n
)
+
(
ξk−1n+1−k − ξnn+1−k
)}
=
1
n
[1− ξnn − ξnn−1 − . . .− ξn2 − ξn1 ]
+
1
n− 1
(
ξn − ξ
n
n
n
)
+
1
n− 2
[ (
ξ2n
2
− ξ
n
n
n
)
+
(
ξ2n−1
2
− ξ
n
n−1
n
)]
+
1
n− 3
[ (
ξ3n
3
− ξ
n
n
n
)
+
(
ξ3n−1
3
− ξ
n
n−1
n
)
+
(
ξ3n−2
3
− ξ
n
n−2
n
)]
+ . . .
+
1
1
[ (
ξn−1n
n− 1 −
ξnn
n
)
+
(
ξn−1n−1
n− 1 −
ξnn−1
n
)
+ . . .+
(
ξn−12
n− 1 −
ξn2
n
)]
=
1
n
[1− ξnn − ξnn−1 − . . .− ξn2 ]
+
[
ξn
1 · (n− 1) +
ξ2n + ξ
2
n−1
2 · (n− 2) + . . .+
ξn−1n + ξ
n−1
n−1 + . . .+ ξ
n−1
2
(n− 1) · 1)
]
− ξ
n
n
n
Hn−1 −
ξnn−1
n
Hn−2 − . . .− ξ
n
2
n
H1 ,
whence the theorem follows. Q.E.D.
